This article deals with some of the strategic prospects for 2010. As well as a survey of the geopolitical scene (European countries, European security, nuclear security, the Middle East, extra-European areas, etc.), it outlines some longer-term systemic issues (the persistence of economic fragility, globalization, discontent with the monopoly of legitimate violence, transborder issues, biosphere challenges, etc.). This perspective gives both the depth of vision and the elevated viewpoint appropriate to the strategist.

There has been much debate in France about the NATO summit being held in Strasbourg and Kehl at the beginning of April. Unsurprisingly, this debate has mainly focused on the comparatively incidental matter of France’s return to NATO, while failing to recognise that this summit is significant from many other points of view, including operational aspects as well as the new European security architecture, which clearly needs updating

NATO has suffered from the Georgian war, which it had provoked indirectly and to which it has not brought any solution. The weakness of the United States and the reassessment of Article 5 have once again given prominence to the debate on Atlantic decoupling—even if that term has rarely been used. The Alliance is henceforth obliged to play a minor role in which, finally, it has few real choices.

For the Alliance, 2008 has been a fairly difficult year: while the Bucha­rest summit was satisfactory, particularly with the adoption of a com­mitment to Afghanistan, the war in Georgia put a question mark over an unstable equilibrium because of its repercussions not only on the ongoing process of enlargement but also on issues such as ballistic mis­sile defence or even Kosovo. As for France, it continues along the path of rapprochement and the debate on defence centres around NATO.

There are several indications that America wants a transatlantic union. The terms of the deal have been re-shaped. Breaking with the old ‘NATO only’ position, the United States seems to be accepting the ‘Brusselist’ concept suggested by Mr Sarkozy: both NATO and an autonomous European defence identity. So a radical change is under way. Although unlikely to be visible from Bucharest, it should profoundly modify transatlantic relations in the next 15 months.

The debate about France’s place in NATO is an old one, older even than General de Gaulle’s decision in 1966 to quit the integrated mili­tary organisation. French political life used to have three major fami­lies; a fourth that has just appeared claims that it can avoid the dead ends of its three predecessors. That is what is discussed here.

The Riga summit demonstrated a degree of Atlantic Alliance confusion that has increased since February, mainly because of Mr Putin’s attitude. Nonetheless, the NATO mechanism has continued to work, whether it is a matter of operations or of other issues. The question of France’s relationship with NATO has evidently been affected by the spring election results, even if that is still not very obvious. But the main issue remains Afghanistan: the transformation of the Alliance is actually taking place there.

‘To keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down’ was how Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, defined the purpose of the organisation. That was in the 1950s, and everyone considers that this view belongs to the past. Everyone that is, except the Russians, who continue to believe that NATO seeks to exclude them. Whether sincere or calculated, this attitude has in any event coloured the year 2007 to the point where we can speak of a return of the Russian question in Europe, and hence of the European question in American strategic priorities. But was this Moscow’s objective?

To all appearances the Riga summit seems a minor one: few decisions were taken because Afghanistan was the major topic of discussion. The only thing that was new was the offer of a partnership with Serbia and Bosnia. This was hardly surprising, since many issues (including the contact group on Afghanistan, partnership and energy security) had been left at working group level, and with the Secretary General in particular. All of which serves to illustrate the lack of political declarations, the lack of inspiration and the lack of drive. To the satisfaction of France the idea of an overall partnership was postponed until a later date.

    From a broader perspective, the military reality in Afghanistan has brought out into the open a number of matters of dissent that had been thought silenced or pacified, and problems that had been thought resolved. After Riga it is now clear that the expansion of NATO missions poses a problem, both with regard to operations well away from Europe and to those tasks which are not strictly military, a problem which gives legitimacy to the ESDP. From this point of view, the Riga summit was not insignificant.

The Balkans are no longer the Alliance’s top operational priority. NATO is maintaining its capability in Kosovo prior to its disengagement, and is keeping its liaison organisation, which advises the local governments in carrying out their defence reforms in line with Euro-Atlantic standards. The creation of an office in Belgrade is the latest sign of this. Today, NATO’s real priority is in Afghanistan, for a fairly simple reason: NATO is not absolutely sure of winning. In a sense, NATO’s operational future is at stake. Will it demonstrate in Kandahar that it is a world security agency? Other theatres must not be neglected. Maritime surveillance of the Mediterranean is an old example, as is the mission in Iraq. Over the last twelve months NATO has set foot in Africa by supporting the AU in Sudan, and has deployed the NRF in Pakistan, although the event remains controversial. New geographical theatres, new missions; an operational transformation of NATO has taken place.